

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 065738  
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66011

DRAFTED BY S/S:PSEBASTIAN:GJK

APPROVED BY S/S:SEBASTIAN

-----242214Z 088494 /62

O 242148Z MAR 77 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 065738

NODIS

WH FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI

FOL RPT KINSHASA 2670 ACTION SECSTATE 24 MAR 77 QUOTE

S E C R E T KINSHASA 2670

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MOPS, PINS, PFOR, CG

SUBJECT: SHABA INVASION: CONSULTATIONS WITH MOBUTU

REF: (A) KINSHASA 2654 (B) KINSHASA 2660 (C) KINSHASA 2644

1. SINCE SENDING REF A I HAVE RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM MOBUTU WHO PROFESSED TO BE HIGHLY DISTURBED BY GROWING INDICATIONS THAT US INTENDS TO YIELD TO SOVIETS' BLATANT THREATS IN AFRICA. HE SAID HE COULD NOT HELP BUT DRAW THIS CONCLUSION FROM STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY VANCE AND AMBASSADOR YOUNG YESTERDAY; WHEREAS SOVIETS AND CUBANS WERE MOVING ABOUT AFRICA, RATTLING THEIR SABRES AND WARNING WEST NOT TO GET INVOLVED IN ZAIRE'S ALLEGEDLY INTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE US SEEMS INTENT ON LIMITING ITS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 065738

RESPONSE TO APPEALS FOR MEDIATION WHILE SIGNALING ZAIRE'S ADVERSARIES THAT MORE ASSISTANCE IS UNLIKELY. I MADE CLEAR THAT NO FINAL DECISIONS HAD YET BEEN TAKEN ON FURTHER ASSISTANCE BUT THAT WE WERE SERIOUS IN OUR DESIRE TO RESOLVE THE SHABA PROBLEM DIPLOMATICALLY. I REMINDED MOBUTU THAT I HAD MADE THIS CLEAR SOME TIME AGO AND HAD ASSUMED THAT HE SHARED OUR VIEW. MOBUTU SAID HE DID, BUT URGENCY OF MILITARY SITUATION COULD

IN THE MEANTIME NOT BE IGNORED. IF THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS HAD TROUBLE WITH MORE MILITARY ASSISTANCE, THE BELGIANS (WHOSE PARLIAMENT HE NOTED WILL NOT BE IN SESSION UNTIL NEXT MONTH) WOULD SEEM TO HAVE FEWER RESTRAINTS. WHY, MOBUTU ASKED, COULDN'T WE FIND A WAY TO USE SOME OF OUR \$30 MILLION FMS CREDITS TO HELP FINANCE ARMS SHIPMENTS FROM BELGIUM? I SAID THAT WE WERE IN TOUCH WITH THE BELGIANS CONCERNING CERTAIN ASPECTS OF MILITARY AID BUT THAT I WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO ADDRESS OFFICIALLY THE KIND OF ISSUE HE HAD RAISED. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT I HAD A MESSAGE TO CONVEY TO HIM ON A RELATED MATTER (REF A) AND SUGGESTED THAT WE GET TOGETHER LATER TODAY, AND HE AGREED.

2. I REPEAT THE ABOVE IN SOME DETAIL TO CONVEY CLEARLY MOBUTU'S DEVELOPING MOOD. HE SENSES OUR SUPPORT SLIPPING AWAY AND IS SUSPICIOUS OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION. THE DANGER HERE, AS ALREADY POINTED OUT IN REF B, IS THAT IN HIS GROWING STATE OF FRUSTRATION HE MAY TAKE ACTIONS WHICH WILL NOT ONLY MAKE OUR SUPPORT MORE DIFFICULT TO PROVIDE, BUT UNDERMINE THE CHANCES FOR A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT AT THE SAME TIME. HIS EFFORTS TO INTERNATIONALIZE THE SHABA PROBLEM BY PUBLICLY LASHING THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS IS ONE CASE IN POINT. ANOTHER IS HIS THREAT TO CALL IN FOREIGN MERCENARIES, WHICH SINCE LAST NIGHT (REF B) HAS NOW BECOME A DECLARED INTENTION INCLUDING AN APPEAL TO US TO HELP IN THIS EFFORT. I THINK THERE IS NOW A SERIOUS POSSIBILITY THAT MOBUTU MIGHT DELIBERATELY SEEK WAYS TO IMPEDE THE DIPLOMATIC MOMENTUM WE ARE NOW ACHIEVING.

3. I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE IMPRESS UPON MOBUTU THE  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 065738

IMPORTANCE OF HIS COOPERATING WITH US AND OTHER FRIENDS IN OUR SEARCH TO PRESERVE ZAIRE'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND PREVENT AN ESCALATION OF THE SHABA CONFLICT TO THE POINT WHERE IT COULD ENGULF ALL OF CENTRAL AFRICA, ZAIRE INCLUDED. SPECIFICALLY, I RECOMMEND THAT WE MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

--AS STATED IN SECRETARY VANCE'S LETTER, WE REMAIN UNWAVERING IN OUR SUPPORT OF ZAIRIAN UNITY, AND WE HAVE ALREADY INDICATED THIS SUPPORT CLEARLY BY RESPONDING TO MOBUTU'S URGENT APPEAL FOR ASSISTANCE.

--WE ARE CONVINCED, HOWEVER, THAT THE BEST AND PERHAPS ONLY FEASIBLE WAY TO RESOLVE THE SHABA PROBLEM IS THROUGH A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN AN ESSENTIALLY AFRICAN CONTEXT.

-- WE HAVE BEEN HEARTENED BY MOBUTU'S COOPERATION IN THIS DIPLOMATIC EFFORT, WHICH HAS MADE EXCELLENT PROGRESS AND HOLDS GOOD PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS.

--THAT SUCCESS CANNOT BE ACHIEVED, HOWEVER, UNLESS MOBUTU GIVES IT HIS FULL SUPPORT AND COOPERATION.

--SPECIFICALLY, WE MUST AVOID ACTIONS WHICH MAY SERVE TO DISRUPT THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS, DISCOURAGE US PUBLIC AND

CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT, AND AT THE SAME TIME GAIN LITTLE OR NOTHING IN TERMS OF THE MILITARY SITUATION. IN THIS REGARD, WE WOULD VIEW FURTHER PUBLIC ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS, PROVOCATIVE MILITARY ACTIONS SUCH AS RAIDS INTO ANGOLA, AND THE INJECTION OF FOREIGN MERCENARIES AS BEING UNHELPFUL.

--ON THE OTHER HAND, MOBUTU COULD MAKE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO HELP OUR COMMON CAUSE BY DEMONSTRATING HIS FULL SUPPORT OF MEDIATION. A PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT WOULD SEEM TO BE AN EFFECTIVE WAY.

--WE HAVE MADE NO FINAL DECISIONS REGARDING ADDITIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE. TOGETHER WITH OUR MUTUAL FRIENDS, WE WISH AND INTEND TO MAINTAIN OUR MATERIAL ASSISTANCE IN SUPPORT OF ZAIRE'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. BUT THE CHANCES OF OUR DOING SO WILL DEPEND IN LARGE MEASURE ON OUR BEING ASSURED THAT ZAIRE WILL SERIOUSLY WORK TOWARD A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF ITS DIFFERENCES WITH ANGOLA.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 065738

AAWE, FOR OUR PART, WILL TAKE EVERY POSSIBLE STEP WITH OTHER PARTIES, INCLUDING CUBA AND THE USSR, TO ELICIT THEIR COOPERATION.

4. THE ABOVE POINTS ARE SUGGESTIONS MADE FROM THE LIMITED PERSPECTIVE HERE, IN FULL REALIZATION THAT ALTERNATIVE OR ADDITIONAL POINTS MAY BE MORE APPROPRIATE TO THE PRESENT STATE OF PLAY. A PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE WOULD PROBABLY STRENGTHEN OUR APPROACH, AS WOULD PARALLEL DEMARCHES BY BELGIUM, FRANCE AND OTHERS INCLUDING, PERHAPS, THE NIGERIANS THEMSELVES. SINCE I WILL HAVE TO SEE MOBUTU LATER TODAY, I WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE ASAP ON POINTS ABOVE, AS WELL AS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES OF FINANCING BELGIAN ARMS SHIPMENTS AND MERCENARIES, BOTH OF WHICH MOBUTU HAS NO RAISED.

CUTLER

UNQUOTE VANCE

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, PROVINCE, SECESSION, CAT-B, PROGRESS REPORTS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, FOREIGN COMMITMENTS, INVASIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Sent Date:** 24-Mar-1977 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1977STATE065738  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** PSEBASTIAN:GJK  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** N770002-0167  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:**  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 2  
**Legacy Key:** link1977/newtext/t19770325/aaaaavjq.tel  
**Line Count:** 155  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** dfa061b2-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ORIGIN NODS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** NODIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** NODIS  
**Reference:** 77 KINSHASA 2654, 77 KINSHASA 2660, 77 KINSHASA 2644  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 10-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 3004928  
**Secure:** LOCK1  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** SHABA INVASION: CONSULTATIONS WITH MOBUTU  
**TAGS:** PINS, PFOR, MOPS, MASS, CG, AO, US, (MOBUTU SESE SEKO)  
**To:** WHITE HOUSE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/dfa061b2-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009